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SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS
PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: A
SEPARATION OF POWERS PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution provides that all treaties made
"under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law
of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby."'
Such treaties constitute this country's international obligations and are
also incorporated into the domestic law of the United States so as to
supersede prior inconsistent federal statutes and inconsistent state
legislation.2 Yet, despite this constitutional grant of supremacy, the3
treaty's operation as domestic law has been judicially circumscribed.
The primary limitation, and the subject of this Comment, is that a
treaty is considered effective as domestic law only if it is self-executing
or implemented by congressional legislation. 4 Traditionally, a selfexecuting treaty gives rise to rights enforceable in domestic courts
upon ratification, while a non-self-executing treaty does not. 5 It should
be noted that the question of self-execution is relevant solely to the
effect of a treaty as domestic law,6 since a properly signed and ratified
treaty is a binding internationalobligation whether or not it is self7
executing.
1.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

2.

Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech,

311 U.S. 150 (1940); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
3. While treaties are subordinate to the Constitution, no court has yet held a
treaty to be unconstitutional. See K. HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW

304 (1967). See also R.

DEVLIN, THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF

128 (1908); Wright, Treaties as Law in National Courts with
EspecialReference to the United States, 32 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1956).
4. K. HOLLOWAY, supra note 3, at 306-07; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAv OF THE UNITED STATES § 141 (1965). See generally 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-85 (1943); 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 302-16 (1970); 74 AM. JUR. 2d Treaties § 3 (1974); 87
THE UNITED STATES

C.J.S. Treaties § 15 (1954).
5.

See note 4 supra.

6. A single treaty instrument may contain some provisions which are selfexecuting and some which are not. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 738
(1934) (concurring opinion).
7. The lack of implementing legislation does not relieve the United States of
the international obligation created by the treaty. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 4, at 309.
See also Deener, Treaties, Constitutions and Judicial Review, 4 VA. J. INT'L L. 7, 15-16

(1964).
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The question of self-execution arises in the United States solely
because the Constitution makes treaties the law of the land.8 The parameters of the problem are defined by the separation of powers doctrine;
therefore, resolution by the courts may involve determinations that
certain issues are "political questions." For example, treaties that
express a rule which the courts do not feel they have the competence
to enforce are generally deemed non-self-executing. Their interpretation and implementation for domestic purposes are left to the political
branches of the federal government-the executive and the legislature.
Courts will then apply whatever decisions those branches make. 10 Thus,
a treaty which is constitutionally valid will not give rise to domestic
legal rights and obligations if it is deemed non-self-executing and the
President or Congress has not undertaken implementing action. Separation of powers problems may arise even when a treaty is considered
self-executing, because while domestic legislation is ordinarily passed
by both houses of Congress, treaties become domestic law as a result
of the concurrent actions of the President and the Senate-thus by-passing the House of Representatives in the law-making process.
This Comment will first examine the background and development
of United States law on self-executing treaties and then focus on the
human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter. 1 Although
these provisions have been held to be non-self-executing, the appropriate approach to the problem would accord them self-executing status.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-EXECUTION
The traditional distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties was first expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall
in Foster v. Neilson. 2 Marshall stated that courts do not have legislative or executive powers and are therefore incapable of enforcing
8. See note 1 supra and accompanying text; 14 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 4, at
309. See also Evans, Self-executing Treaties in the United States of America, 30 BRaIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 194 et seq. (1953) (discussing self-execution of treaties in different
countries).
9. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969)

("It is well-established

that the federal courts will not adjudicate political questions ....") ; Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (political questions are not justiciable primarily because of the
separation of powers within the Federal Government).

10. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
treaties' constitutionality in all other respects.
11.
12.

U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).

This assumes the
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treaties which require implementing legislation. He considered such
non-self-executing treaties to be contracts which do not create immediately enforceable rights and which require subsequent implementation by both legislative and executive action in order to have domestic effect:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be
accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but
is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective
powers to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our
Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in the courts of justice as equivalent to an
act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid
of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation
import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department, and the legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the courts.' 3
Clearly, Marshall was aware of the separation of powers problem with

its attendant "political question" attributes.
Although courts have since paid obeisance to Marshall's theory in
Foster, questions have been raised concerning the validity of its initial

application. In a subsequent case, United States v. Percheman,14 involving the same treaty and similar facts, Marshall found the treaty
self-executing. At issue in both Foster and Percheman was the interpretation of a single treaty provision concerning private ownership
of titled land in territory ceded to the United States by Spain. In
Foster, the Supreme Court utilized the English text of the treaty and
ruled that the provision dealing with ratification and confirmation of
such grants of land required further domestic legislation to become
effective. The Court held that the boundaries of the ceded territory
were unclear and that the question should be resolved by the political
branches (especially since Congress had established a commission to
rule on the matter). The treaty was therefore deemed non-self-executing. However, after examining the Spanish text of the same treaty
provision in Percheman, the Court reversed itself, holding that the
treaty itself ratified and confirmed the land grants and was, therefore,
self-executing. The only significant factual difference between the two
13.
14.

Id. at 314.
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
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cases was that Percheman involved lands clearly within the ceded territory, while Foster did not. If in Foster the Court had held the treaty
to be self-executing, it would have meant granting title to land not
necessarily claimed by. the United States under the treaty, thereby
encroaching upon the executive's jurisdiction over foreign affairs. Since
the Spanish text of the treaty clearly indicated the scope of the land
claimed in Percheman, there was no need to defer to the interpretation of the political department.
The two cases are compatible since both were based on the same
constitutional theory. In Foster, separation of powers prevented Marshall from considering the treaty self-executing, whereas in Percheman
the clarity of the treaty provisions precluded a separation of powers
problem from arising. Thus, in two cases reaching contrary results,
Chief Justice Marshall established the basis for the self-execution doctrine.
II.

SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT

In determining whether or not a particular treaty is self-executing,
courts have stressed traditional principles of treaty interpretation rather
than the theoretical bases of the self-execution doctrine. For example,
the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]reaties are to be interpreted upon
the principles which govern the interpretation of contracts in writing
between individuals .... 1 Courts thus have applied to treaties rules
of construction generally applied to contracts and statutes. These rules
are relevant to understanding a treaty's terms, but are not necessarily
dispositive of the question of self-execution.
Courts have held that a treaty should first be examined as a whole,
including its history and the problems it was meant to solve. 10 They
have preferred to construe treaties liberally, 17 under the assumption
15. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921). See also Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (a treaty provision having statutory form held selfexecuting); United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Duplessis Shoe Mach. Co., 148 F. 31 (D. Mass.
1906).
16. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 59, 203 N.E.2d 640, 642, 255
N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (1964). See generally Schreuer, The Interpretation of Treaties by
Domestic Courts, 45 BaiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 255, 271-81 (1971).
17. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 192 (1961). See also Valentine v. United
States, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Geofroy
v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879);
Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830); Schreuer, supra note 16, at 286,
296-97.
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that the parties intended to render them "as effective as possible."' 8
Treaties have generally been considered self-executing when "their
terms clearly convey such an intention and provide in sufficient detail
standards for executive-administrative application"' 9 which, standing
alone, would be enforceable in a court. However, where the terms expressly indicate that treaty obligations are to be discharged through
subsequent legislative action, or where they fail to provide specific
guidelines for executive action, treaties have been considered nonself-executing2 0 Thus, where the treaty provisions are less than clear,
the important criterion for the courts is the draftsmen's intent: "Treaties must receive a fair interpretation, according to the intent of the
contracting parties, and so as to carry out their manifest purpose." 21
Courts have considered several factors as indicating the parties'
intent that the treaty operate without further legislation. The terms of
the treaty are first examined for express stipulations that it should or
should not be self-executing.2 2 Language couched in the present tense
provides evidence of an intent to make the treaty self-executing; 23
prospective terms usually indkate a non-self-executing treaty 2 4 Yet,
use of the future tense does not always indicate that a treaty was intended to be non-self-executing; if the treaty is to become operative
only at a future date, its terms would necessarily be phrased in the
future tense.
Other factors the courts may look to for the intent to make a
treaty self-executing include the purpose of the treaty, 25 the history of
the treaty, 26 circumstances surrounding the treaty's execution (evidenced by such extrinsic factors as diplomatic correspondence and interpretative documents) ,27 traditional treatment of the treaty's subject
18. Schreuer, supra note 16, at 296.
19. 14 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 4, at 302, 309-10.
20. Id. See also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933); Vanity Fair
Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
21. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 57 (1903).
22. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10 (1889).
23. See, e.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924); Tucker v. Alexan-

droff, 183 U.S. 424, 429 (1901).
24. Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 1929).
25. Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940); Wright
v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 57 (1903).
26. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118 (1933).
27. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); Aerovias Interamericanas De
Panama, S.A. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Fla. 1961); Eck
v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964).
See also 5 G. HAeKWORTH, supra note 4, at 180-83; 2 C. HYDE, INTFRNATiONAL LAW
1482-83 (1945); Note, 31 NEB. L. REv.463, 474 (1952).
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matter,2 8 and the interpretation given a treaty by the political depart-

ments of the government. 29 Courts have also looked to the actions of
foreign countries; where other countries have utilized implementing
legislation for particular treaties, courts have found the intent to require legislation domestically.3 0 This last approach, however, is extremely questionable, since self-execution is primarily a domestic constitutional doctrine rather than one of international law, and foreign
countries observe constitutional procedures that differ from those of
the United States.
Courts have not only required clarity in a treaty's terms for it to
be self-executing, but have also indicated concern for the separation
of powers problems in focusing on the nature of the right to be enforced. It has been suggested that Congress has exclusive legislative
competence in certain areas which might be the subject matter of
treaties. 31 The implication is that if Congress has such exclusive competency as to those areas in domestic law, then the President and Senate
cannot encroach upon it by making domestic law through the treatymaking power.3 2 The separation of powers concept, preserving for
Congress those matters considered within its exclusive competency,3
would here lead to a determination that a treaty is non-self-executing.8
For example, treaties involving appropriations, customs duties, disposition of government property, and establishment of criminal jurisdiction and sanctions-areas exclusively within congressional jurisdiction-are all deemed to be non-self-executing. 34 Treaties dealing with
28. See, e.g., Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1929).
29. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290
U.S. 276, 295 (1933); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921); In re Georgakopoulos, 81 F. Supp. 411, 412 (E.D. Pa. 1948). See also 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 4,
at 180-84.
30. See Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 501-02 (4th Cir. 1929);
Rousseau v. Brown, 21 App. D.C. 73 (1903). But ef. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan Am.
Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
31. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 148, 159 (1972);
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

FOREIGN

RELATIONS

LAW

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES

§ 141(3) (1965).
32. See 5 G. HAcKIwORTH, supra note 4, at 181; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141, comment f, at 435 (1965);
11 M. WHrrEmAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 846 (1970). See also Evans, supra
note 8, at 180-83.
33. See note 32 supra. See also 5

J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241
(1906); Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-The Fujii Case, 45 Am. J. INT'L
L. 62, 68 (1952).
34. 14 M. WHITEmAN, supra note 4, at 305. See generally Ortman v. Stanray
Corp., 371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967) (convention on protection of industrial property);

1976]

SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES

extradition, consular rights, most-favored nation treatment, friendship,
smuggling and reciprocal rights or treatment of aliens are usually held
to be self-executing, since their making is considered to be within
the executive's foreign affairs power.35 This subject-matter approach
poses problems, however; broad areas of congressional legislative competency (such as regulation of foreign commerce) and the executive's
foreign affairs powers have not been precisely defined. Thus, some
"gray areas" exist where treaties on subjects ostensibly within Congress'
exclusive competency have been considered self-executing, despite separation of powers considerations. 36
The self-execution doctrine's most serious problem is that there
is no sure method for determining whether or not a treaty is selfexecuting.3 7 Marshall's approach to the problem as an aspect of separation of powers is theoretically proper, and should be used by courts in
reaching their decisions while they further define congressional and
executive powers vis-h-vis treaty subjects. The tests most frequently
employed by courts (e.g., language and surrounding circumstances)
have often derived from theoretically questionable propositions and
Robertson v. General Elec. Co. 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1929) (treaty relating to'patent
rights); Aerovias Interamericanas De Panama, S.A. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 197 F.
Supp. 230 (S.D. Fla. 1961) (treaties for expenditure of funds are ineffective without
an accompanying appropriation); The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925)
(treaties do not function so as to enact a country's fiscal or criminal law); A.
McNAm, THE LAW OF TREATIES 80 (1961); Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties SelfExecuting?, 20 Ams. J. INT'L L. 444 (1926); Wright, The Legal Nature of Treaties, 10
AM. J. INT'L L. 706, 719 (1916). Contrary to the view that for the purposes of imposing criminal sanctions no treaty is self-executing, there is the strong belief that the
treaty instrument can be used to impose criminal sanctions for breach of the treaty's
obligations by American citizens, thereby obviating the need for implementing legislation.
See 5 G. HAcKWORTH, supra note 4, at 16-17; J. HENDRY, TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 92 (1955).

35. 14 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 4, at 305. See also Bacardi Corp. of America v.
Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940) (protection of trademarks and patents); Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933)

(sanctions for smuggling intoxicating liquors);

Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (reciprocal treatment of aliens); Vanity Fair
Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956) (reciprocal protection of
trademark owners from trademark infringement and unfair competition); Indemnity
Ins. Co. of North America v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1945)
(convention on air travel liability); American Exp. Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cust.
App. 146 (1913) (most-favored nation clauses); Wright, supra note 3, at 4.
36. Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940) (patents and
trademarks); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1899) (immigration);
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887) (commerce). See also 5 G. I-ACIWORTH, supra
note 4, at 177-78; J. HENDRY, supra note 34, at 91; L. HENKIN, supra note 31, at 149.
37. See Aerovias Interarnericanas De Panama, S.A. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
197 F. Supp. 230, 245 (S.D. Fla. 1961) ("[Ilt is difficult to extract any clear principle
for judicial guidance from the cases discussing this subject.").
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have concentrated more on the intent of the parties than on the constitutional bases of the problem. This has resulted in judicial misapplication of the self-execution doctrine and has served to frustrate
domestic acknowledgment of rights and obligations undertaken by the
United States in the international arena.
III.

SELF-EXECUTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER:

THE

HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS

The United Nations Charter is a treaty. Although some of the
Charter's provisions have been deemed self-executing,88 the human
rights provisions have not.39 Controversy over the domestic legal status
of the human rights provisions has haunted the courts for more than
twenty-five years. Two provisions of the Charter, articles 55 (c) and 56,
constitute the core of international pronouncements on the subject of
human rights. Article 55 (c) is a statement of basic principle, calling
for the promotion of "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion. '40 This is followed by the statement in article
56 that "all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55."41

Judicial pronouncements on the domestic legal status of the
human rights provisions first appeared in a series of cases dealing with
state alien land laws. 42 In Oyama v. California,43 the United States
Supreme Court found that part of California's Alien Land Law violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In concurring
opinions, four justices stressed the incompatibility and inconsistency
38. Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950)
(United Nations was granted legal capacity under article 104 to bring suit against the
United States for damages to United Nations cargo being carried on a ship owned by
the United States); Curran v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206
(Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 784, 88 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep't 1949) (United
Nations could hold land in New York and was granted immunity from suit under

articles 104 and 105).
39. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
40.

U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
42. State alien land laws generally prohibit aliens ineligible for United States
citizenship from acquiring land within the state. Such land usually escheated to the
state by operation of the statute. See, e.g., CAL. PROBATE CODE § 259 (West 1956).
43. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).

41.
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of the state law with the human rights provisions and indicated their
approval of using the Charter as one basis for striking down the
statute. 44
Namba v. McCourt45 was the first case to hold that the Charter
could be a basis for decision. There, a state court invalidated Oregon's
alien land laws partly on the ground that the United States "became
bound" to articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, thus requiring state law
to yield to the supreme law of the land.4 6 This case was soon followed
by the celebrated decision of the California District Court of Appeals
in Sei Fujii v. State.47 The Court held that certain provisions of California's Alien Land Law were violative of the letter and spirit of the
United Nations Charter, the relevant parts of which (articles 1, 2, 55
and 56) were deemed self-executing and therefore the supreme law
of the land.48 A spate of criticism followed the California court's
decision, 49 giving impetus to attempts to amend the Constitution's
treaty-making provision so that all treaties would be non-self-executing.5 0
Critics of the Fujii decision were soon mollified when, on appeal,
the Supreme Court of California, in holding the Alien Land Law to
be unconstitutional, predicated its decision on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than the Charter's human
rights provisions. 51 The court found the Charter provisions to be vague
and lacking the intent necessary to make them self-executing:
The provisions of the charter pledging cooperation in promoting
observance of fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory quality
and definiteness which would indicate an intent to create justiciable
rights in private persons immediately upon ratification. Instead, they
are framed as a promise of future action by the member nations. 52
44.

Id. at 649-50.

45.

185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).

46.

204 P.2d at 579.

47.

217 P.2d 481 (1950), rehearing denied, 218 P.2d 595 (1950).

48.

217 P.2d at 487-88.

49. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REc. 5993-6000 (1950); Hudson, Charter Provisions on
Human Rights in American Law, 44 Am. J. INT'L L. 543 (1950).
50. See, e.g, S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S.J. Res. 130, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). See also 99 CONG. REc. 6777-78 (1953); 98 CONG. REc. 907-14

(1952). See generally R.

MAcBRuD,

TREATIES

VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION

(1956).

51. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). For two cases
discussing discrimination in land ownership, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
and Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
52. 38 Cal. 2d at 724, 242 P.2d at 621-22.
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The court's decision was partially based upon the separation of
powers doctrine. The court reasoned that the human rights provisions
"were not intended to supersede existing domestic legislation," and
therefore were not "intended to become rules of law for the courts
of this country upon the ratification of the charter. ' 3 In the absence
of other compelling evidence, the court relied upon, and was hesitant
to contradict, the executive's interpretation of the Charter; namely, that
article 56 was not meant to infringe "upon [the members'] right to
order their national affairs according to their own best ability, in
their own way, and in accordance with their own political and economic institutions and processes. '" 54 This reliance on the executive's
view indicates the similarity between the issue of self-execution and
the "political question" rationale. The decision came at a time prior
to Brown v. Board of Education,55 when many states had laws which
restricted the very rights the Charter was meant to promote. The
executive, aware of the possible conflict between the Charter provisions
and domestic law, avoided an interpretation which would have made
those provisions the supreme law of the land. By resting its decision
upon the fourteenth amendment, the court circumvented the risks
attendant to incorporation of the Charter's human rights provisions
into United States domestic law.m6 The "political question" approach
to Fujii, manifested in the finding of non-self-execution, thus enabled
the court to calm fears that United States treaty obligations could be
used to run roughshod over domestic law.
Despite Fujii, the Charter's human rights provisions can be viewed
as self-executing. Any analysis must focus upon two questions: (1) Do
the human rights provisions represent legal obligations? (2) If so, are
they obligations which domestic courts can apply? The first question
is basically one of international treaty law. If the human rights provisions were not legal obligations, they would not be considered the
supreme law of the land under article VI of the Constitution, thereby
precluding any further discussion of self-execution. The second question, that of self-execution, is one of purely domestic constitutional law.
53. Id. at 722, 724-25, 242 P.2d at 621, 622.
54. Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by
the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State, Dep't of State
Publication 2349, Conference Series 71, at 115 (June 26, 1945).
55. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. Note that even though the court avoided incorporating the human rights
provisions into domestic law, it reached a decision compatible with them. See Evans,
supra note 8, at 189; Note, 30 B.U.L. REv. 555, 561 (1951).

SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES
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The bulk of authority supports the proposition that the provisions
are indeed legal obligations:
There is a distinct element of legal duty in the undertaking expressed in Article 56 in which "All Members pledge themselves to
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization

for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." The
cumulative legal result of these pronouncements cannot be ignored
57

Scholars also have looked to the legislative history of the Charter and
determined that the final text, along with its history, exhibits an in-

tention that article 56 be construed as a legal obligation. They have
concluded that article 56 "requires Members to see that their organs
of government respect and observe human rights in carrying out their
normal functions ....
The next question to be answered is that of self-execution: Can
the legal rights and obligations contained in the human rights provisions be applied by domestic courts of the United States without
further legislation? It has already been noted that the major reason
expressed for viewing the Charter provisions as non-self-executing has
been that they contain vague terms which merely contemplate prospective goals, with the development of detailed standards and enforcement procedures left for future determination. 9
Through resort to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 60
which has reduced a "substantial part of customary law to writing,"' 1
57. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUIAN RIGHTS 147 (1950),
as cited in Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses
of the Charter,66 Am. J. INT'L L. 337, 339 (1972).
58. Wright, supra note 33, at 73. It should be noted that the International Court

of Justice has ruled article 56 to be a legal obligation. See Advisory Opinion on the Legal

Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16,
reprinted in 66 Ami. J. INT'L L. 145 (1972). For excellent analyses of this area, see
Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REv. 643, 646-53 (1951) ; Schwelb, supra note 57.
59. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
60. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 Ams. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
The Convention has yet to achieve the necessary ratifications or accessions of thirty-five
countries in order to become binding international law. When ratified it will become
the domestic law of the United States and apply to interpretation of the United
Nations Charter by virtue of article 5: "The present Convention applies to any treaty
which is the constituent instrument of an international organization .. " See generally
S. ROSENNE, THE LAw OF TREATIEs (1970); Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on
Treaties, 64 Asi. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970).

61.

U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 39/11/Add. 1, at 170 (1969).
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one may conclude that the Charter provisions describe sufficiently detailed rights. A reading of article 31(8)2 of the Convention suggests
that such "subsequent agreements" to the Charter as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights63 and the Covenants on Human Rights 4
provide the necessary clarification and detail supposedly lacking in the
Charter's human rights provisions, thus enabling domestic courts to
apply specific rights and standards.
Specificity of rights is also indicated in the analogous situation of
People of Saipan v. United States Departmentof Interior.5 In that case,

a trusteeship agreement between the United States and the United Nations for the administration of the trust territory of Micronesia was
held to provide a source of individual legal rights for citizens of that
territory. The court felt that the terms of the agreement suggested an
"intention to establish ...

judicially enforceable rights," and that "the

enforcement of these rights require[d] little legal or administrative
innovation in the domestic fora .
"...-66
The specified rights in the
trusteeship agreement derived from the Charter's chapter on the International Trusteeship System, specifically article 76(c), which is in part
a verbatim restaiement of the human rights set forth in article 55(c).
The analogy between the trusteeship agreement on the one hand, and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants on the
other, is clear: each serves to clarify and specify the human rights and
obligations contained in the Charter provisions, thereby stating specific
rules which a domestic court could apply.
62. U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 39/27 (1969). Article 31(3) states:
There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-

tation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation ....
63. U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Although the Declaration is a mere statement of
concern, meant to outline a "common standard of achievement" in the area of human
rights, still it is more specific concerning such rights than is the Charter. Id.
64. U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 56 DEP'T STAT. BULL. 107 (1967). The
Covenants are in force as international treaties and await ratification or accession by
the United States; they expand the substantive rights listed in the Declaration and
include specific statements of legal obligation. See note, The United Nations Covenants on

Human Rights and the Domestic Law of the United States, 48 B.U.L. REv. 106, 107
(1968).
65. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at 97. It should be noted that the court held these rights to be initially
enforceable in the High Court of the Trust Territory; the federal district court would
have jurisdiction only if the High Court deemed itself not to have the power to
adjudicate the issue involved. Id. at 99, 100.

1976]

SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES

Even if the human rights provisions are detailed and specific, one
must still consider their subject matter and inquire whether the courts
can, in practice, implement the rights and obligations contained in
them. Although Congress has legislated on the subject in the Civil
Rights and Voting Rights Acts, 67 human rights have also been the
subject matter of treaties.68 It is suggested that this subject falls into
a "gray area," where legislative competency is based upon the treatymaking power of the President and Senate or upon congressional
powers. The mistake of the Fujii court was that it expressly based its
decision on the parties' intent, rather than on the more appropriate
theoretical consideration of subject matter. Consequently, the decision
rested more on an international law basis than on the proper domestic
constitutional law considerations.
The United States has obligated itself to cooperate with the United
Nations, and the legal rights and obligations contained in the Charter's
human rights provisions are valid subject matter for self-execution.
Moreover, they are sufficiently prescriptive and detailed to be applied
by domestic courts. While further domestic legislation, might be necessary to establish administrative procedures or machinery to enforce
actively or give practical effect to such rights,6 9 the least that American
courts can do is to recognize the supremacy of these rights as United
States domestic law. For their part, various governments (federal, state
and local) could pursue minimal observance by abstaining from the enactment of "laws which would impair a right," and by preventing
"agencies and [government] officials from performing acts which im70
pair a right."
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of self-executing treaties has been used for over 150
years as a vehicle to ensure the separation of powers in the federal
government. Despite the judicial reluctance to deal with proper theo67. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in
scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,

79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p (1970)).
68. It should be noted that such treaties have been limited in coverage and
often veiled in the guise of reciprocal treatment of aliens. See, e.g., Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan, Feb. 21, 1911, art. I, 37 Stat. 1504 (1911), T.S. No.
558. See also Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
69. This would be a matter solely for domestic legislation, since it involves appropriations and staffing.
70. Wright, supra note 33, at 77.
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retical considerations, it is clear that self-execution is a domestic law
problem which cannot be resolved on an international law basis.
The clearest test for self-execution requires a two-stage analysis.
First, the treaty's subject matter must be considered. Separation of
powers concepts are applicable here, since they bear directly on the
constitutional basis for regarding the treaty as domestic law. Some
matters will fall exclusively within the competence of Congress and
will therefore be considered non-self-executing, while other matters,
not within such competence, will be considered self-excuting. In addition, some subjects will fall into the "gray area" where the Congress
and the President and Senate share competence. It is here that the
courts, guided by separation of powers considerations, must further
refine the self-execution doctrine. The second step is to determine
whether the treaty states a rule sufficiently detailed for the courts to
apply. This poses a question of the courts' practical enforcement abilities, rather than the theoretical problem of the constitutional basis for
application of the rule.
In approaching the self-execution problem, the courts have unfortunately failed to deal adequately with separation of powers considerations by relying primarily on other, more superficial criteria such
as intent of the parties and surrounding circumstances, and by not
recognizing the larger role played by the subject matter test. The Fujii
court's handling of the Charter's human rights provisions is a clear
example of a situation in which a "gray area" subject was refused
domestic enforcement. Only when the courts begin to deal with the
question of self-execution more in the theoretical constitutional terms
of subject matter will the proper application of the doctrine be effected.
CHALEs W. STOTrER

